{"id":654,"date":"2014-11-19T02:32:27","date_gmt":"2014-11-19T07:32:27","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/kendoc911.wordpress.com\/?page_id=654"},"modified":"2014-11-19T02:32:27","modified_gmt":"2014-11-19T07:32:27","slug":"norads-purpose","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/911warroom.com\/kendoc\/norad\/norads-purpose\/","title":{"rendered":"NORADS PURPOSE"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>NORAD\u2019s PURPOSE<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>On 9\/11, why weren&#8217;t standard operating procedures and protocols followed for hijacking scenarios?<\/p>\n<p>THE FAA AND NORAD<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.rutgerslawreview.com\/2011\/1-the-faa-and-norad\/<br \/>\n&#8220;On 9\/11 the defense of U.S. air space depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The last hijacking that involved U.S. air traffic controllers, FAA management, and military coordination, had occurred in 1993. In order to understand how the two agencies interacted eight years later, we will review their missions, command-and-control structures, and working relationship on the morning of 9\/11.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>PROTOCOLS FOR RESPONDING TO HIJACKINGS<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.rutgerslawreview.com\/2011\/2-protocols-for-responding-to-hijackings\/<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;\u201cExcept when specifically directed otherwise by FAA headquarters,\u201d existing protocol provided the fighter escort aircraft must remain covert and be \u201cvectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft.\u201d Indeed, on 9\/11, the fighter aircraft, once scrambled and launched, were prepared and trained to: 1) approach and identify the target and 2) provide a covert escort (a \u201cshadow\u201d) for the aircraft until it landed safely at an airport&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>\nThis is a good bit of research that covers NORAD&#8217;s stated purpose:<br \/>\nhttps:\/\/sites.google.com\/site\/deanjackson60\/airamerica<\/p>\n<div class=\"tumblr-post\" data-href=\"https:\/\/embed.tumblr.com\/embed\/post\/B6OtqhGEqbQ8EhwnS5TOqQ\/47221431\" data-did=\"b18fc25fe8a87ca1612afcdc07ff5789884a1bff\"  ><a href=\"https:\/\/rockcreekfreepress.tumblr.com\/post\/47221431\/where-was-norad-on-911\">https:\/\/rockcreekfreepress.tumblr.com\/post\/47221431\/where-was-norad-on-911<\/a><\/div>\n<p><script async src=\"https:\/\/assets.tumblr.com\/post.js\"><\/script><\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The NORAD mission is threefold. NORAD&#8217;s first responsibility is to provide SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL [emphasis mine] of the airspace covering North America, specifically the airspace of Canada and the United States. This mission is based on agreements between the two governments\u2026<br \/>\nThe second part of NORAD&#8217;s mission is to provide the NCAs with tactical warning and attack assessment of an aerospace attack against North America. This information is essential to providing those in command with information to aid them in making decisions on how to respond to an attack against North America.<br \/>\nNORAD&#8217;s third responsibility is to provide an appropriate response TO ANY FORM OF AN AIR ATTACK [emphasis mine]. NORAD was created to provide a defense against the threat from air-breathing aircraft, specifically the threat from long-range bombers. However, over the years the threat has changed. Now NORAD must provide an appropriate response to a multitude of threats, to include the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).&#8221; &#8212; NORAD AIR DEFENSE OVERVIEW; Northeast Parallel Architectures Center, Syracuse University, pre-19952 (http:\/\/www.npac.syr.edu\/projects\/civ\/vanguard\/C2Demo\/OPRef.html)<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>\nMonitoring and controlling the airspace covering North America is called air sovereignty.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/findarticles.com\/p\/articles\/mi_qa3731\/is_199709\/ai_n8766326<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;NORAD defines air sovereignty as providing surveillance and control of the territorial airspace, which includes:<br \/>\n1. intercepting and destroying uncontrollable air objects;<br \/>\n2. tracking hijacked aircraft;<br \/>\n3. assisting aircraft in distress;<br \/>\n4. escorting Communist civil aircraft; and<br \/>\n5. intercepting suspect aircraft, including counterdrug operations and peacetime military intercepts.\u201d<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>\n\u201cNORAD defines \u2018sovereign airspace\u2019 as: the airspace over a nation\u2019s territory, internal waters, and territorial seas. NORAD\u2019s territorial seas extend 12 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Canada. Sovereign airspace above a nation\u2019s territory is unlimited.\u201d<br \/>\n\u2014 NORAD AIR DEFENSE OVERVIEW; Northeast Parallel Architectures Center, Syracuse University, pre-1995<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.npac.syr.edu\/projects\/civ\/vanguard\/C2Demo\/OPRef.html<\/p>\n<p>So anyone who says NORAD was only postured to look outward on 9\/11 (e.g. Gen Myers) is misinformed or lying.<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>\nDown The Memory Hole: NORAD\u2019s Air Sovereignty Mission And The 9\/11 Commission Report<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.corbettreport.com\/articles\/20081220_norad_v.htm<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Aircraft flying over our air space [emphasis mine] are monitored seven days a week, 24 hours a day. Much of the identifying process is done by hand.<\/p>\n<p>Flight plans from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are compiled in logs and have to be manually searched to identify aircraft.<\/p>\n<p>There will be a learning curve for Air Guard operators, but the system that Litton touts as faster and better will ultimately make their job easier. Unlike current operating procedures, the new system will mean fewer manual inquiries and phone contact with FAA officials about commercial aircraft. The FAA flight plan is now hooked up via computer with the new R\/SAOCs so operators can easily track friendly aircraft through our air space without [emphasis mine] having to get someone on the phone or thumb through written log books of flight plans.&#8221;<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\n\u200e&#8221;In 1997, the Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS)\u2014another of NORAD\u2019s three air defense sectors in the continental US\u2014tracks 427 unidentified aircraft, and fighters intercept these \u201cunknowns\u201d 36 times. The same year, NORAD\u2019s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) handles 65 unidentified tracks and WADS handles 104 unidentified tracks, according to Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region on 9\/11.&#8221;<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20040805122223\/http:\/www.1staf.tyndall.af.mil\/defender\/April98\/force.htm<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>\n&#8220;A General Accounting Office report published in May 1994 states that \u201cduring the past four years, NORAD\u2019s alert fighters took off to intercept aircraft (referred to as scrambled) 1,518 times, or an average of 15 times per site per year.\u201d Of these incidents, the number of scrambles that are in response to suspected drug smuggling aircraft averages \u201cone per site, or less than 7 percent of all of the alert sites\u2019 total activity.\u201d The remaining activity, about 93 percent of the total scrambles, \u201cgenerally involved visually inspecting unidentified aircraft and assisting aircraft in distress.\u201d<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.fas.org\/man\/gao\/gao9476.htm<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>\nIn 1998, SEADS logs more than 400 fighter scrambles.<br \/>\n&#8220;The First 600 Days of Combat&#8221; Grant 2004 pg. 14<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.afa.org\/media\/scripts\/Grant_Conf.asp<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>\nGenerals Get Power to Shoot Civilian Jets<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/abcnews.go.com\/US\/story?id=92414&#038;<\/p>\n<p>Sept. 27, 2001.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;ABCNEWS has learned that President Bush has given two regional Air Force commanders new powers to order the shooting down of commercial airliners without presidential authorization, if the situation warrants such an attack on a civilian aircraft.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;We have put these new orders into effect, under orders of the president, because we&#8217;re trying to do the best we can to prevent future incidents like those that occurred on September 11th,&#8221; the NORAD official told ABCNEWS.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>NOTES: Bush changed the &#8220;rules of engagement&#8221; and who can give direct orders to shootdown aircraft shortly after 9\/11. He gave this new power to NORAD generals Arnold and Schwartz. What this shows is that NORAD generals never had the power or authority to shoot down aircraft before 9\/11.<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<\/p>\n<p><strong>STANDARD INTERCEPT PROCEDURES<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Standard Intercept Procedures<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.standdown.net\/FAAstandardinterceptprocedures.htm<\/p>\n<p>\u201cIt is a fact that standard intercept procedures for dealing with these kinds of situations are totally established, in force and online in these United States 365 days a year, 7 days a week, 24 hours a day.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Regarding rules governing IFR requirements, see FAA Order 7400.2E<\/p>\n<p>&#8216;Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters,&#8217; Effective Date: December 7, 2000<br \/>\n(Includes Change 1, effective July 7, 2001), Chapter 14-1-2. Full text posted at:http:\/\/www.faa.gov\/ATpubs\/AIR\/air1401.html#14-1-2FAA<\/p>\n<p>Guide to Basic Flight Information and Air Traffic Control (ATC) Procedures,&#8217;<br \/>\n(Includes Change 3, Effective: July 12, 2001) Chapter 5-6-4 &#8220;Interception Signals&#8221;<br \/>\nFull text posted at: http:\/\/www.faa.gov\/ATpubs\/AIM\/Chap5\/aim0506.html#5-6-4<\/p>\n<p>FAA Order 7110.65M &#8216;Air Traffic Control&#8217; (Includes Change 3, Effective: July 12, 2001), Chapter 10-2-5 &#8220;Emergency Situations&#8221; Full text posted at:http:\/\/www.faa.gov\/ATpubs\/ATC\/Chp10\/atc1002.html#10-2-5<\/p>\n<p>FAA Order 7110.65M &#8216;Air Traffic Control&#8217; (Includes Change 3, Effective: July 12, 2001), Chapter 10-1-1 &#8220;Emergency Determinations&#8221; Full text posted at:http:\/\/www.faa.gov\/ATpubs\/ATC\/Chp10\/atc1001.html#10-1-1<\/p>\n<p>FAA Order 7610.4J &#8216;Special Military Operations&#8217; (Effective Date: November 3, 1998; Includes: Change 1, effective July 3, 2000; Change 2, effective July 12, 2001), Chapter 4, Section 5, &#8220;Air Defense Liaison Officers (ADLO&#8217;s)&#8221; Full text posted at:http:\/\/www.faa.gov\/ATpubs\/MIL\/Ch4\/mil0405.html#Section%205<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>\nFAA Order 7610.4J &#8216;Special Military Operations&#8217; (Effective Date: November 3, 1998; Includes: Change 1, effective July 3, 2000; Change 2, effective July 12, 2001), Chapter 7, Section 1-2, &#8220;Escort of Hijacked Aircraft: Requests for Service&#8221; Full text posted at: http:\/\/faa.gov\/ATpubs\/MIL\/Ch7\/mil0701.html#7-1-2<\/p>\n<p>&#8216;Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3610.01A,&#8217; 1 June 2001, &#8220;Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects,&#8221; 4. Policy (page 1) PDF available at: http:\/\/www.dtic.mil\/doctrine\/jel\/cjcsd\/cjcsi\/3610_01a.pdf<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\n&#8220;The NORAD mission is threefold. NORAD&#8217;s first responsibility is to provide SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL [emphasis mine] of the airspace covering North America, specifically the airspace of Canada and the United States. This mission is based on agreements between the two governments\u2026<br \/>\nThe second part of NORAD&#8217;s mission is to provide the NCAs with tactical warning and attack assessment of an aerospace attack against North America. This information is essential to providing those in command with information to aid them in making decisions on how to respond to an attack against North America.<br \/>\nNORAD&#8217;s third responsibility is to provide an appropriate response TO ANY FORM OF AN AIR ATTACK [emphasis mine]. NORAD was created to provide a defense against the threat from air-breathing aircraft, specifically the threat from long-range bombers. However, over the years the threat has changed. Now NORAD must provide an appropriate response to a multitude of threats, to include the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).&#8221; &#8212; NORAD AIR DEFENSE OVERVIEW; Northeast Parallel Architectures Center, Syracuse University, pre-19952 (http:\/\/www.npac.syr.edu\/projects\/civ\/vanguard\/C2Demo\/OPRef.html)<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>\n\u201cNORAD defines \u2018sovereign airspace\u2019 as: the airspace over a nation\u2019s territory, internal waters, and territorial seas. NORAD\u2019s territorial seas extend 12 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Canada. Sovereign airspace above a nation\u2019s territory is unlimited.\u201d<br \/>\n\u2014 NORAD AIR DEFENSE OVERVIEW; Northeast Parallel Architectures Center, Syracuse University, pre-1995<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.npac.syr.edu\/projects\/civ\/vanguard\/C2Demo\/OPRef.html<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\n9\/11 Commission Report<br \/>\nChapter 1, Page 31<br \/>\n&#8220;The defense of U.S. airspace on 9\/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols.&#8221;<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.9-11commission.gov\/report\/911Report_Ch1.htm<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>\nAIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND DESTRUCTION OF DERELICT<br \/>\nAIRBORNE OBJECTS<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.wanttoknow.info\/010601dod.pdf<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<\/p>\n<p><strong>NORAD RESPONDED \u201c67 TIMES\u201d LEADING UP TO 9\/11<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\u201cNORAD, responsible for intercepting errant aircraft over the U.S., has a standard operating procedure for scrambling planes for interception which takes less than 15 minutes. They did this successfully (on time) 129 times in 2000 and and 67 times between September 2000 and June 2001. Yet, on September 11th, they failed to do their job 4 times in a single day:<\/p>\n<p>NORAD, once notified of the off-course aircraft, failed to scramble jets from the nearest bases.<br \/>\nOnce airborne, interceptors failed to reach their targets because they flew at small fractions of their top speeds.<br \/>\nFighters that were airborne and within interception range of the deviating aircraft were not redeployed to pursue them.<\/p>\n<p>You might think that the military couldn&#8217;t find the hijacked planes because the hijackers turned off the transponders. However, a former air traffic controller, who knows the flight corridor which the two planes which hit the Twin Towers flew &#8220;like the back of my hand&#8221; and who handled two actual hijackings says that planes can be tracked on radar even when their transponders are turned off (also, listen to this interview).<\/p>\n<p>NORAD\u2019s stand down on 9\/11 was so blatant that NORAD has been forced to give 3 entirely different versions of what happened that day, as each previous version has been exposed as false. When someone repeatedly changes his testimony after being caught in lies, how believable is he? The falsity of NORAD\u2019s explanations were so severe that even the 9\/11 Commission considered recommending criminal charges for the making of false statements.\u201d<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.prisonplanet.com\/articles\/march2008\/280308Stand.htm<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>\nNORAD scrambled jets 67 times from September 2000 to June 2001<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.wanttoknow.info\/020812ap<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>\nNORAD success rate leading up to 9\/11 in 2001 (67 Times):<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.911truth.org\/article.php?story=20040731213239607<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\nProfile: Tom Herring (F-15 PILOT)<br \/>\n1990-2001: NORAD Regularly Launches Fighters to Intercept Suspicious Aircraft before 9\/11<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.historycommons.org\/entity.jsp?entity=tom_herring_1<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>\nConfirmed: 9\/11 Planes Were Tracked even With Transponders Turned Off<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/georgewashington.blogspot.ca\/2008\/03\/confirmed-911-planes-were-tracked-even.html<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>\nMilitary now notified immediately of unusual air traffic events<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/911research.wtc7.net\/cache\/planes\/analysis\/norad\/020812ap.html<br \/>\n&#8220;From Sept. 11 to June, NORAD scrambled jets or diverted combat air patrols 462 times, almost seven times as often as the 67 scrambles from September 2000 to June 2001, Martin said.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>McCook Daily Gazette. August 13th, 2002.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/news.google.com\/newspapers?nid=1933&#038;dat=20020813&#038;id=WoIjAAAAIBAJ&#038;sjid=WWsFAAAAIBAJ&#038;pg=1545%2C5312135<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>\n67 Intercepts (9\/11 MYTHS?)<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.911myths.com\/html\/67_intercepts.html<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>\n&#8220;Before September 11, the only time officials recall scrambling jets over the United States was when golfer Payne Stewart\u2019s plane veered off course and crashed in South Dakota in 1999.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>However, the National Defence,Performance Report, For the period ending March 31, 2000, States: When an aircraft is not identified within two minutes, it becomes an item of interest to NORAD. If required,\u201cunknown aircraft\u201d are intercepted and identified by aircraft dedicated to NORAD. Over the past year, NORAD has intercepted 736 aircraft, 82 of which were suspected drug smugglers.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/publications.gc.ca\/collections\/Collection\/BT31-4-50-2000E.pdf<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>\nNORAD Should Stand Trial for 9\/11 Stand-down<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/911debunkers.blogspot.ca\/2014\/07\/action-alert-norad-should-stand-trial.html<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\nA General Accounting Office report published in May 1994 states that \u201cduring the past four years, NORAD\u2019s alert fighters took off to intercept aircraft (referred to as scrambled) 1,518 times, or an average of 15 times per site per year.\u201d Of these incidents, the number of scrambles that are in response to suspected drug smuggling aircraft averages \u201cone per site, or less than 7 percent of all of the alert sites\u2019 total activity.\u201d The remaining activity, about 93 percent of the total scrambles, \u201cgenerally involved visually inspecting unidentified aircraft and assisting aircraft in distress.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>http:\/\/www.fas.org\/man\/gao\/gao9476.htm<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\n&#8220;In 1997, the Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS)\u2014another of NORAD\u2019s three air defense sectors in the continental US\u2014tracks 427 unidentified aircraft, and fighters intercept these \u201cunknowns\u201d 36 times. The same year, NORAD\u2019s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) handles 65 unidentified tracks and WADS handles 104 unidentified tracks, according to Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region on 9\/11.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>http:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20040805122223\/http:\/www.1staf.tyndall.af.mil\/defender\/April98\/force.htm<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\nIn 1998, SEADS logs more than 400 fighter scrambles.<br \/>\n&#8220;The First 600 Days of Combat&#8221; Grant 2004 pg. 14<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\nGeneral Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD on 9\/11, will later state that in the year 2000, NORAD\u2019s fighters fly 147 sorties. &#8211; 9\/11 Commission 6\/17\/2004<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\nIn 2000 there are 425 \u201cunknowns,\u201d where an aircraft\u2019s pilot has not filed or has deviated from a flight plan, or has used the wrong radio frequency, and fighters are scrambled 129 times in response. Linda Slobodian, Calgary Herald Oct 13, 2001<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\n&#8220;From Sept. 11 to June, NORAD scrambled jets or diverted combat air patrols 462 times, almost seven times as often as the 67 scrambles from September 2000 to June 2001, Martin said.<\/p>\n<p>In June, Air Force jets scrambled three times to intercept small private planes that had wandered into restricted airspace around the White House and around Camp David, the presidential retreat.&#8221;<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/911research.wtc7.net\/talks\/flights\/procedures.html<br \/>\nhttps:\/\/news.google.com\/newspapers?nid=1933&#038;dat=20020813&#038;id=WoIjAAAAIBAJ&#038;sjid=WWsFAAAAIBAJ&#038;pg=1545,5312135&#038;hl=en<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<\/p>\n<p><strong>AFTER 9\/11<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Bush Announces New Airline Security Measures<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.pbs.org\/newshour\/updates\/transportation-july-dec01-air-security_09-27\/<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;In Washington, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld outlined new defense department regulations in response to the attacks. Rumsfeld said two Air Force generals have been authorized to order the military to shoot down any passenger plane that appears to threatening U.S. cities.<\/p>\n<p>Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., would have authority to order the shoot-down of a threatening commercial flight over the 48 contiguous states. Lt. Gen. Norton A. Schwartz at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, would have authority for Alaska.<\/p>\n<p>Only in the most extraordinary circumstances could the two generals order the shoot-downs without first consulting with the president, the defense secretary, or other high-level official, Rumsfeld said.&#8221;<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>NORAD\u2019s PURPOSE On 9\/11, why weren&#8217;t standard operating procedures and protocols followed for hijacking scenarios? THE FAA AND NORAD http:\/\/www.rutgerslawreview.com\/2011\/1-the-faa-and-norad\/ &#8220;On 9\/11 the defense of U.S. air space depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The last hijacking that involved U.S. air traffic controllers, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":4449,"parent":200,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/911warroom.com\/kendoc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/654"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/911warroom.com\/kendoc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/911warroom.com\/kendoc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/911warroom.com\/kendoc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/911warroom.com\/kendoc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=654"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/911warroom.com\/kendoc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/654\/revisions"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/911warroom.com\/kendoc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/200"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/911warroom.com\/kendoc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4449"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/911warroom.com\/kendoc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=654"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}